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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURAL RESOURCES LAW OF 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
This is a cautionary tale of two wetlands, each providing new 
insight into the old problem at the heart of natural resources law, 
each offering new testimony for the old rule of unintended conse-
quences. It is the story of two vast regions of coastal and inter-
tidal marsh that have been dissolving into salty waters despite 
the most well-intended natural resource management policies. 
The plight of those who depend on these wetlands-and the frus-
tration of those who accidentally hastened their demise-
highlights the importance of developing more sensitive models of 
environmental assessment to match the increasing efficacy of our 
technological power to alter the environment, even inadvertently. 
This article tells the stories of the disappearing wetlands ring-
ing the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and the Chesapeake Bay of Vir-
ginia and Maryland, which are vanishing under different circum-
stances but bear the same message for environmental policy 
makers: more sophisticated natural resource planning is required 
to avoid the unanticipated consequences that can cause even well-
intended policies to backfire. The stories suggest that a model of 
environmental assessment that better tracks the complex net-
work characteristics of regional ecosystems would yield better 
long-term results, and this article proposes a network-based 
model that expands the lateral, temporal, and causal analysis of 
conventional environmental review. 
Although the Louisiana and Chesapeake wetlands are disap-
pearing under different circumstances, we will miss them for 
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many of the same reasons. As do all wetlands, the Louisiana and 
Chesapeake wetlands function as the mushy margin between 
land and water-the buffer zone that protects what is best about 
either side from undue interference by the other. Like the spongy 
doormat strategically placed at your threshold, tidal wetlands ab-
sorb the stream of overland pollutants washed by stormwater 
from our streets, yards, factories, and farms toward the sea, miti-
gating the marine-fouling effects of fertilizer, pesticides, motor 
oil, asphalt sealants, and cleaning solvents that threaten water 
quality, commercial fisheries, and marine ecosystems on the 
other side of the wetland.1 But the spongy doormat is amazingly 
reversible: the same wetland serves to mitigate the undesirable 
movement of sea onto land, absorbing the effects of tidal flooding 
and storm surge that otherwise threaten the integrity of coastal 
development and habitat. 2 
Increasing coastal development makes us more vulnerable on 
either side of this threshold; more development means more land-
based marine pollution to intercept and more vulnerable invest-
ment to protect against marine incursion. And yet at least half of 
all wetlands along the East Coast have already been lost to devel-
opment since western settlement,3 and with them the many im-
portant ecosystem services that wetlands provide, including pol-
lutant filtration, flood control, and marine nursery habitat. 4 
Since the late 1980s, we have heralded a national wetlands pol-
icy of "no net loss," pledging to forestall further degradation of 
this critical wetland margin.5 And yet the Louisiana Gulf Coast 
and Chesapeake wetlands-two of the most admired and com-
mercially important regional wetlands in the nation-continue to 
1. See E.P.A., Wetlands Functions and Values Module, http://www.epa.gov/wa ter· 
train/wetlands/module05.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
2. See Robert Viguerie, Coastal Erosion: Crisis in Louisiana's Wetlands, 51 LA. B.J. 
85, 86 (2003). 
3. Thomas E. Dahl, Wetlands: Losses in the United States 1780's to 1980's (U.S. Dep't 
of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, 1990), available at http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/ 
resource/othrdata!wetloss/wetloss.htm; see also JAMES RAsBAND ET AL., NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAw AND POLICY 821 (2004) ("Since European settlement, the continental United 
States has lost roughly half of its wetlands through drainage, conversion, and erosion."). 
In many states, "urbanization is responsible for over 90 percent of coastal wetland losses." 
DAVID SALVESON, WETLANDS: MITIGATING AND REGULATING DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS 21 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
4. WILLIAM MURRAY TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 642 (2d ed. 1997). 
5. RAsBAND ET AL., supra note 3, at 821. 
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disappear. The waning coastal wetlands of southern Louisiana 
became national news when the storm surges of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita catastrophically flooded the City of New Or-
leans. Meanwhile, the fragmented estuarine wetlands of the 
Chesapeake are all that stand in the way of further degradation 
of the most commercially and environmentally important estuary 
in the country,6 made famous by the growing "dead zone" that be-
gan drawing serious concern in the 1950s.7 
Although separate stories with distinct histories, the tales of 
the lost Gulf Coast and Chesapeake Bay wetlands unite to dem-
onstrate the frustrating quandary at the center of modern natu-
ral resource management. Neither loss represents the result of 
laissez-faire resource exploitation; rather, each follows a lengthy 
era of well-intended resource management strategy. Louisiana's 
losses follow three hundred years of natural resource engineering 
to accomplish effective flood control along the Mississippi River,8 
while the Chesapeake losses follow the most meticulously for-
ward-thinking and scientific program of wetlands-protective 
natural resource planning of its time. And yet, New Orleans suf-
fered a catastrophic flood, and Chesapeake wetlands continue to 
disappear. How could this happen? 
Call it the "Natural Resources Law of Unintended Conse-
quences." Louisiana's pioneering natural resource managers tried 
to prevent flooding by channelizing the Mississippi River, but in-
terfering with the natural cycle of sediment deposition in the 
floodplain starved the wetlands that would have mitigated the 
hurricane storm surge that drowned New Orleans after Hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita. 9 Having learned the lesson of wetlands' 
role within an ecosystem, Virginia resource managers attempted 
to protect intertidal wetlands by establishing a development-free 
6. See HOWARD R. ERNST, CHESAPEAKE BAY BLUES: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE 
STRUGGLE TO SAVE THE BAY 10 (2003) ("The Chesapeake Bay is the largest of the nation's 
850 estuaries."). 
7. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, The Chesapeake Bay's Dead Zone, http://www. 
cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resources_facts_deadzone#cause (last visited Apr. 5, 
2006) ("Over the last four decades, the volume of hypoxic and anoxic water in the Chesa-
peake Bay has more than tripled."). 
8. Beginning in the nineteenth century, navigation became as important a purpose of 
Louisiana's levee system as flood control. See Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Lou· 
isiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TuL. L. REV 3, 21 (1983). 
9. See Cornelia Dean & Andrew C. Revkin, Hurricane Katrina: Geography; After 
Centuries of 'Controlling' Land, Gulf Residents Learn Who's Really the Boss, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 2005, at A14. 
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jurisdictional boundary. But when landowners then built all the 
way to the legal side of the line, they inadvertently doomed the 
protected wetlands by disconnecting them from the natural shore-
line systems that sustain them during such periods of sea-level 
rise as we are currently experiencing.10 In each case, natural re-
source management accomplished the exact opposite of what poli-
cymakers had hoped for. 
Of course, the protagonists in these stories may deserve our 
sympathy. When Louisianans first began channelizing the Mis-
sissippi, they may not have understood the process by which it 
would damage coastal wetlands, nor the significance of the loss. 11 
They fell prey to the classic fallacy of single-issue natural re-
source management, by which early natural resource managers 
mistakenly believed that they could alter one feature in an eco-
system without worrying about the effects on other features 
within the system. Hundreds of years later, the Virginia Depart-
ment of Natural Resources formulated a rigorous management 
strategy expressly based on the relationship between interde-
pendent features in the Chesapeake Bay ecosystem. Applying the 
best-available science, they calculated jurisdictional boundaries of 
the tidal wetlands necessary to protect water quality in the most 
life-productive regions of the Bay, but, still in the early years of 
modern natural resource planning, 12 they did not consider how 
the policy would fare over long periods of time-and unfortu-
nately, it did not fare well. Situated centuries apart, the two sto-
ries nevertheless show that the leaming curve in natural re-
source management remains exquisitely painful. 
Hindsight thus helps us understand how such unintended con-
sequences came to pass, but the more important question is 
whether it can help us avoid like results in the future. And in-
deed, hindsight indicates that overcoming the Natural Resources 
Law of Unintended Consequences is possible, though it requires 
10. See James G. Titus, Does the U.S. Government Realize that the Sea Is Rising? How 
to Restructure Federal Programs So That Wetlands and Beaches Survive, 30 GoLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 717,718-19 (2000). 
11. But see Houck, supra note 8, at 10 (documenting that these principles were estab-
lished at least by the late 1970s and early 1980s). The decision by later natural resource 
managers, primarily the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, not to change course in light of 
this understanding deserves less sympathy. 
12. RAsBAND ET AL., supra note 3, at 285 ("Other than the occasional consideration 
given to mineral-bearing lands, until well into the nineteenth century little thought was 
given to managing land with reference to the resources on that land."). 
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more sophisticated natural resource planning tools. Each of our 
two cautionary tales show that wetland losses were incurred not 
for lack of planning, but for not planning systemically enough. 
Natural resource management inevitably proceeds from a state 
of disquieting uncertainty; we never have all the science, all the 
data, or all the information we need to make vexing management 
decisions about such complex adaptive systems as regional eco-
systems. Complex adaptive systems-found not only in nature 
but also in economics, organizational behavior, developmental 
learning, game theory, and neuroscience-are characterized by 
interaction between components within a unified system, or net-
work.13 Complexity theorists suggest that complex adaptive sys-
tems function best when connectivity among the multiple compo-
nents is fostered, and changes are effectively diffused across the 
self-correcting features of the network.14 Management strategies 
that anticipate the interconnectivity between even remote net-
work components enable the network to function as an integrated 
whole. 15 
However, isolating cause and effect can be challenging when 
the connectivity between network components enables changes to 
reverberate back and forth within an ecosystem (for example, 
when flood control works contain a river within its banks, but 
lead to the depletion of coastal wetlands that would mitigate 
flooding, further stressing water levels at the river's terminus). 
But the lesson is not that natural resource planning is a hopeless 
endeavor dooming us to failure no matter how well-intended. The 
lesson is to better align assessment techniques with the model of 
network connectivity demanded by complex adaptive systems, 
and to preserve management flexibility as much as possible so 
that we can update approaches to adjust for new information. 16 
Respecting the integrated network of ecosystem components, en-
13. See MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE 
AND COMPLEX 16-21 (1994) (discussing the characteristics of complex adaptive systems). 
See generally M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE 
OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992) (describing the science of complexity theory and related re-
search by the Santa Fe Institute). 
14. See John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land 
Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (2006) (applying complex adaptive system 
theory in the context ofland use law); supra note 13. 
15. See Nolon, supra note 14, at 20. 
16. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Regulation By Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005). 
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vironmental intervention should ideally follow assessment that 
takes full account of: (1) how the networked components of re-
gional ecosystems work laterally, (2) how the systems work over 
ecologically meaningful periods of time, and (3) how remote net-
work factors may intervene from beyond the forward linear path 
of conventional causal assessment. 
By their compelling testimonials to the Natural Resources Law 
of Unintended Consequences, the losses of the Louisiana and 
Chesapeake wetlands demonstrate the importance of environ-
mental assessment along all three dimensions. The Gulf Coast 
story stands for the importance of expanding assessment later-
ally-through the full chain of regional ecosystem interconnect-
edness by which apparently disparate natural systems are actu-
ally causally linked. The Chesapeake story stands for the 
importance of expanding assessment temporally forward-over 
time horizons that may exceed the general frame of reference for 
other kinds of policymaking-and urges greater assessment sen-
sitivity to causal factors that may intervene from unanticipated 
comers of the network. 
On the basis of these cautionary tales, this article suggests that 
natural resource planners expand on traditional assessment 
technique toward a model that better tracks the network rela-
tionships between the causally integrated components of regional 
ecosystems. Whereas traditional causal assessment begins with 
the proposed action and traces only those potential impacts that 
flow forward in time from the proposal, the Chesapeake story 
shows that some natural resource management strategies are 
doomed by network interplay that will not appear in this forward-
limited chain of projected events. A better approach would also 
consider how remote network factors might independently inter-
fere with the success of the proposal. In other words, rather than 
simply considering what undesirable results might flow forward 
from the proposed action, assessment should also ask what fore-
seeable network factors might intervene, at any point in time, 
that could cause the proposed action to become, itself, undesir-
able. 
Such causally ambidextrous assessment techniques are fre-
quently used in consumer product designs, in which testers con-
sider not only such harms as the product might cause, but also 
what uses might harm the product, what circumstances might 
arise in which the product could be misused, and the circum-
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stances in which product use might fully backfire, producing are-
sult opposite the product's intended purpose. 17 For its rigorous 
approach to this third line of inquiry, the quality assurance proc-
ess of computer programming provides a particularly useful ex-
ample on which to base a network-integrated model of environ-
mental assessment.18 Software testers do more than ask what 
problems a given program might cause within its network envi-
ronment; they also ask what in the network environment might 
cause problems for the program.19 
But this network model of expanded assessment is hardly the 
invention of professional technocrats; it is also the careful strat-
egy of weighing possibilities and testing alternatives that most of 
us regularly employ whenever faced with important decisions 
along our personal paths. Ideally, so powerful a tool of good deci-
sion making should also be a regular part of natural resource 
planning. Although expanded assessment poses the formidable 
problems of cost-control and limit-setting, assessment ambitions 
can be checked by strategic coupling with risk analysis and a 
carefully considered boundary of proximate causation. Moreover, 
the long-term savings enabled by expanded assessment practices 
will offset this initial investment, as the lost opportunity to better 
protect New Orleans so powerfully demonstrates. 
Indeed, the message of the lost Louisiana and Chesapeake wet-
lands is that more ambitious environmental assessment has been 
made necessary by our own increasing power to alter the natural 
environment. The efficacy with which we have reshaped the Mis-
sissippi Delta since resource planning began in New Orleans-
and the resulting devastation of the City after Hurricane 
Katrina-shows that we have simply become too effective at 
natural resource management, and that assessment technique 
must advance to match our awesome capacity for environmental 
modification. When well-intended natural resource law can has-
ten the drowning of a great city and further endanger the nation's 
largest estuary, we should rightly ask more from natural resource 
planning. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. Id. 
19. ld. 
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Part II reviews the Natural Resources Law of Unintended Con-
sequences in action in Louisiana, and highlights the importance 
of laterally expansive environmental assessment. Part III reviews 
how the Law ofUnintended Consequences persists in the ongoing 
Chesapeake Bay story, despite the acknowledged lessons from the 
Gulf Coast. The Chesapeake story highlights the importance of 
both temporally expansive assessment and assessment more sen-
sitive to factors that might undermine a management strategy 
from beyond the narrow path considered by traditional linear as-
sessment. Part IV proposes that natural resource planning adopt 
assessment techniques that expand from the traditional linear 
model to a network-based model that, coupled with limiting risk 
analysis, would take better account of the causal factors that 
might lead us, however inadvertently, toward unintended conse-
quences. 
II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND LOUISIANA: COASTAL 
WETLAND LOSS AND THE FLOODING OF NEW ORLEANS 
Our first cautionary tale involves the wetlands of southem 
Louisiana that fringe the Gulf Coast. Before western settlement, 
these expansive wetlands extended over some five million acres of 
marshy, vegetated hydric soils20 buffering the Louisiana low-
lands, including the present City of New Orleans, from the wind 
and waters of the Gulf. The wetlands were themselves protected 
from the force of the sea by a series of barrier islands that have 
also mostly succumbed to more recent human intervention. To-
day, these wetlands exist as a fraction of their pre-settlement 
state, covering only 1, 730,000 acres, 21 fragmented by marine in-
cursion and weakened by the network of pipelines that have been 
laid beneath them. More than 800,000 acres were lost between 
1900-1980,22 and nearly as much has been lost since 1980.23 Sci-
20. Houck, supra note 8, at 7. 
21. Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, Case Studies: The Louisiana Coast, http://www.ies.wisc.edu/international/land 
scape/case_study_Louisiana.htm Clast visited Apr. 5, 2006) (offering the figure at 7,000 
square kilometers, which I have converted to acres; 1 square kilometer is 247 acres). 
22. Houck, supra note 8, at 11. 
23. Based on the 1983 estimate that forty-seven square miles were disappearing each 
year, I extrapolate by multiplying that figure by the twenty-three years that have passed, 
and converting miles to acreage (1 square mile is 640 acres). 
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entists estimate that at the present rate, a full third of what re-
mains will be gone by the year 2050.24 
Under the "no net loss" wetlands protection policy heralded by 
the federal government since the first Bush Administration, 25 de-
velopers must seek permits from the Army Corps of Engineers be-
fore converting wetlands to more solid ground with fill. 26 But 
most southern Louisiana wetlands are not disappearing under 
shopping malls and planned neighborhoods. Instead, they are 
disappearing into the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico. And as 
television viewers across the globe witnessed in horror last Sep-
tember, their disappearance contributed to the most devastating 
natural disaster in the history of the United States, the catastro-
phic flooding of New Orleans after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Tragically, the collapse of these coastal wetlands is the ulti-
mate but unintended consequence of the success of centuries of 
natural resource management efforts to contain the seasonal 
movement of the Mississippi River into its floodplain. The tale of 
the lost Louisiana wetlands is thus also the story of old-fashioned, 
single-issue natural resource management colliding with the 
technological forces of modernity that make single-issue natural 
resource management no longer possible. In "single-issue" man-
agement, early natural resource managers fallaciously assumed 
that they could alter one feature in an ecosystem without impact-
ing other features within the system. But Katrina brought home 
that we have simply become too good at what we do-too effective 
at natural resource management-to ignore the systemic conse-
quences of management choices that alter any one of the many 
interdependent components of an ecosystem. 
24. See United States Army Corps of Engineers News Orleans District, Louisiana 
Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Project, http:// www.mvn. usace.army.millprjllca/ 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006) ("As a result of the human activities and natural coastal proc-
esses, during the past century the state of Louisiana lost between 600,000 and 900,000 
acres of valuable coastal vegetative wetlands. Estimates reveal that another 342,000 acres 
will be lost between now and the year 2050."); see also Viguerie, supra note 2, at 85. 
25. JULIE M. SIBBING, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, NOWHERE NEAR NO-NET-
LOSS (2004), http://www.nwf.org/nwfwebadminlbinaryVault/Nowhere_Near_No-Net-Loss. 
pdf. 
26. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). 
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A. Channelizing the Mississippi River 
The Louisiana wetlands are disappearing in the wake of one of 
the most ambitious natural resource management efforts in the 
history of the world: the centuries-long campaign to control mas-
sive seasonal flooding by the Mississippi River into the great ag-
ricultural and industrial regions established in its floodplain and 
culminating in the Great City of New Orleans at its mouth. 27 
The largest river in the country,28 the Mississippi drains nearly 
half the continental United States into the Gulf of Mexico.29 But 
the mighty Mississippi is not just moving water; it is also moving 
mud, or sediments, funneling them through its giant network of 
tributaries into the Mississippi Delta near New Orleans.30 This is 
the natural pattern of "alluvial rivers" like the Mississippi. The 
water coursing through an alluvial river scours the bottom of the 
watercourse, moving sediments ever downstream.31 The physical 
dynamics of moving water deposits the sediments on forward 
stretches of bed and in point bar formation, exaggerating bends 
over time, changing the very course and shape of the river. 32 
These sediments, together with those washed in by storm water, 
are ultimately deposited as the rich agricultural soils at the delta. 
In this way, the Mississippi deposits nearly half a million tons 
of sediment into the delta each day.33 Over the last five thousand 
years, the river has built some 19,000 square miles of southern 
Louisiana34-roughly the 300 coastal miles between Texas and 
Mississippi, and the 50 miles inland.35 And until recently, it has 
sustained this vertically accreted land against the natural forces 
27. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 8, at 16-18. 
28. James G. Wiener et al., U.S. Geological Survey, Status and Trends of the Nation's 
Biological Resources, http://biology.usgs.gov/s+t/SNT/noframe/ms137.htm Clast visited Apr. 
5, 2006). 
29. Nat'l Park Serv., General Information About the Mississippi River, http://www. 
nps.gov/miss/features/factoids/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
30. Viguerie, supra note 2, at 86. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. 
33. See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. § 874 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. Landrieu) 
[hereinafter Landrieu]. 
34. See Houck, supra note 8, at 22. 
35. Interview by David Brancaccio with Ted Falgout, Denise Reed, Daniel Zuerdling 
and Oliver Houck, PBS NOW: NEW ORLEANS AND THE DELTA (PBS television broadcast, 
Sept. 2, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcriptltranscriptNOW135_full. 
html [hereinafter Brancaccio]. 
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of erosion by periodically flooding its banks and replenishing the 
soil with more sediment.36 
In addition to depositing sediment directly at the mouth of the 
river, the Mississippi replenishes the lands in its floodplain 
through a cyclical process of flooding. 37 Periodically, after espe-
cially wet seasons in the uplands, the increased volume of water 
forces the river beyond its usual banks and flows out over the ad-
jacent lands, or floodplain.38 Such regular flooding maintains 
healthy riparian wetlands in two ways: it keeps them moist with 
water content, and just as importantly, it adds rich, new soil on a 
regular basis.39 In its pre-settlement state, the Mississippi Delta 
and floodplain were thus characterized by moist, loosely packed 
wetlands soils, and corresponding riparian vegetation.40 
This natural cycle of flooding and deposition produced the most 
active land-building region in North America, which proceeded 
unimpeded until European settlement around the turn of the 
eighteenth century. When Spanish explorers first visited in 1543, 
they arrived during a flood, found the Native Americans storing 
their belongings in trees, and promptly departed for dryer pas-
tures.41 The French arrived at the lowlands that would become 
New Orleans during the dry autumn months of 1718.42 At that 
time of year, the point at which the great river emptied into the 
sea appeared a particularly auspicious location for a commercial 
port city-so the French colonists began to build.43 The next 
spring, when the river spilled from its autumn banks into the 
spring floodplain-just as it had done for thousands of years-the 
colonists found themselves in the water.44 
But the settlers were resourceful, and not easily deterred. To 
prevent further flooding, they built a small, earthen wall between 
the river and their homes-a levee. 45 All was well for a few years 
until the next particularly rainy season, when the settlement was 
36. Viguerie, supra note 2, at 86. 
37. I d. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. Houck, supra note 8, at 17-18. 
42. ld. at 18. 
43. I d. 
44. I d. 
45. See id. 
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again flooded by waters that reached the floodplain from farther 
upstream beyond the levee.46 The floodplain, naturally, sloped 
downward in elevation from these uplands all the way to the 
sea-and right over New Orleans. So the settlers rebuilt the levee 
a little higher and extended it a little farther upstream and con-
tinued in this pattern. 47 By the mid-1700s, the levee extended 
thirty miles from New Orleans.48 By 1828, the river was walled on 
both sides from New Orleans all the way to Baton Rouge.49 
Over the next three hundred years, the levees grew higher and 
higher and moved further and further upstream to protect devel-
opment all along the river floodplain, effectively "channelizing" 
the river by constraining its natural pattern of alluvial deposition 
and accretion.50 By the early twentieth century, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers had taken over the project of managing the 
flood control works, constructing new levees in 1911 and 1926, 
now with the additional purpose of promoting deep water naviga-
tion.51 Mter the river managed to jump even the higher confines 
of the twentieth-century levees in 1950, the Army Corps of Engi-
neers applied itself to better protect "'the National interest in 
controlling the mighty river,"'52 and further improved the flood 
control works that already were, from an engineering standpoint, 
brilliant. 53 And alas, here is where the Natural Resources Law of 
Unintended Consequences sets in. 
B. Flood Control Intensifies the Great Flood 
In the short term, flood control efforts were generally 
effective54-the river was successfully channelized within the 
levee system and seasonal flooding was contained, allowing for 
46. Id. 
47. See id. 
48. Id. 
49. ld. 
50. See Nat'l Wetlands Research Ctr., U.S. Geological Survey, Land Sinks, Waters 
Rise, Coastal Wetlands Disappear, http://www.lacoast.gov/watermarks/2005-08/lwetlands 
Disappear/index.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
51. See Houck, supra note 8, at 19-21. 
52. Id. at 18 (quoting Mississippi River Comm'n, U.S. Army Corps of Mississippi River 
and Tributaries Project, Cario to the Gulf(1977)). 
53. E.g., John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Shifting Tides, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans), June 26, 2002, at 14. 
54. Even so, the river overflowed the levees and caused widespread damage in 1849 
and 1950, when flood heights topped walls that would have sufficed but for continuing ex-
tensions upstream. See Houck, supra note 8, at 18. 
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system and seasonal flooding was contained, allowing for the ex-
pansion of homes and businesses into the plentiful river flood-
plain. 55 But when the seasonal flooding ceased, so did the annual 
deposition of moisture and bedload into the floodplain and delta 
soils.56 This caused two problems, now made famous by the post-
Katrina plight of New Orleans. 
First, as the formerly moist wetland soils began to dry out, they 
started to lose loft, sinking down a bit.57 Soil compaction of this 
sort may prove of little consequence in the uplands, but as history 
witnessed after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, even a small loss of 
elevation is of great consequence in the delta lands around New 
Orleans that were already very close to sea level.58 But soil com-
paction was not the only cause for concern. In addition, the natu-
ral forces of wind and water erosion, to which the soil is con-
stantly subject, were no longer being counterbalanced by the 
regular deposition of river sediment that had formerly sustained 
it. 59 As one narrative compellingly tells it, the interruption of the 
river's seasonal flooding was tantamount to putting the riparian 
and coastal wetlands on a starvation diet.60 
As a result of these two factors, the lands have been gradually 
subsiding at ten times the normal rate over the last century.61 
More and more of the greater New Orleans area suffered gradual 
elevation loss, falling below sea level.62 Indeed, just how much of 
New Orleans now sits below sea level was made devastatingly 
clear during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when mechani-
cal pumps struggled to move water out of the basin lowlands.63 
But New Orleans is at least a basin, ringed with higher elevation 
lands that generally keep the sea at bay. 64 The true margin be-
tween the land and the sea-the coastal wetland-is simply re-
ceding into the open water.65 As the soil continues to subside and 
55. Mark Fischetti, They Saw it Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A23. 
56. See Viguerie, supra note 2, at 86. 
57. See id. 
58. Dean & Revkin, supra note 9. 
59. Viguerie, supra note 2, at 85-86. 
60. Brancaccio, supra note 35 (interviewing Oliver Houck). 
61. Dean & Revkin, supra note 9. 
62. E.g., Evan Thomas, The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 45. 
63. E.g., Evan Thomas, How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 33-35. 
64. McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 53. 
65. See id. 
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the sea inundates the lowest-lying wetlands below New Orleans, 
coastal marshes are crumbling into the sea.66 In the last century, 
these wetlands have been sinking into the sea at the rate of an 
area the size of some forty football fields each day.67 
The coastal wetlands already weakened by river channelization 
were further undermined by the final subject of natural resource 
management in the delta, the discovery of rich stores of carbon-
based fuels. Thanks to the proximity of these stores to the Port of 
New Orleans, the delta region became perhaps the most impor-
tant energy hub in the continental United States, supplying 
nearly twenty percent of domestic demand for oil and natural 
gas.68 As a result, beginning in the 1930s and accelerating after 
the 1950s,69 some 20,000 miles of oil and gas pipeline were laid 
through these coastal marshes, 70 which further weakened any re-
silience to erosion left in the wetlands. The Army Corps of Engi-
neers now estimates that by 2040, the shoreline may advance 
landward by as much as thirty-three miles.71 
Coastal wetlands provide many important natural resource 
services, but Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the especially 
grave consequences of coastal wetland loss for the City of New 
Orleans. In addition to providing wildlife habitat and water fil-
tration, one of the most important ecosystem services that wet-
66. Nat'l Wetlands Res. Ctr., U.S. Geological Survey, Stemming the Tide: The Missis-
sippi River Delta and the Davis Pond Freshwater Diversion Project, http://www.lacoast. 
gov/programs/DavisPond/stemming-the-tide.htm Clast visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter 
Stemming the Tide]. 
I d. 
67. ld. 
68. Viguerie, supra note 2, at 86. 
69. Houck, supra note 8, at 27-28. 
70. Stemming the Tide, supra note 66. 
Whereas the levees lessen the flow of fresh water into wetlands, channels 
dredged for commercial shipping and oil extraction have created new path-
ways for the flow of salt water into the coastal interior. In the latter half of 
the 20th century, a pattern emerged. Areas once dominated by freshwater 
marshes experienced conversion to more salt-tolerant species. Brackish 
marshes converted to saltwater. The heightened salinities killed off the exist-
ing vegetation, causing the root systems that bind the submerged soil to de-
cay. And because the yearly sediment deposits were no longer there to 
counter the ongoing wind and wave erosion at the delta's edge, soil substrates 
anchoring exposed marshes were simply washed away, converting once func-
tional wetlands into open water. 
71. See Hope Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to Its Ears in Alliga-
tors, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 315 (1991). 
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lands provide is-ironically-flood control.72 By crude analogy, 
coastal wetlands serve as giant sponges-or the doormat at a 
threshold, absorbing the stormwater that you do not want to 
bring in with you. And when hurricanes come ashore, they help 
absorb the impacts of storm surge. 73 
As we learned during the hurricane season of 2005, the great-
est source of disaster for New Orleans during both Katrina and 
Rita was the storm surge, the bulge of water raised over normal 
tide levels by the upward funnel effect of hurricane winds. 74 Hur-
ricane Katrina raised the surge twenty-nine feet over normal tide 
levels, enough to weaken and breach the levees holding Lake 
Pontchartrain back from New Orleans. 75 When the levees were 
breached, the lake emptied into the bowl-shaped city, now farther 
below sea level than it had been even at the time it was first set-
tled due to the soil subsidence effect of the river's channeliza-
tion. 76 Because the city was below sea level, the water could not 
drain out of it by gravity alone; indeed, this was a feat requiring 
months of mechanical pumping.77 It was thus that, despite the 
best of natural resource management intentions, aggressive flood 
control efforts along the Mississippi River inadvertently ripened 
the conditions that led to the great flooding of New Orleans after 
Katrina. 
The loss of Louisiana's coastal wetlands portends other impor-
tant regional problems as well. For example, the 20,000 miles of 
oil and gas pipelines laid through the coastal marshes were not 
built to withstand exposure to the open ocean, but many are now 
located in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico-causing great con-
cern at Port Fourchon, the command center of the Gulf Coast oil 
and gas industry.78 Leaks and breakages are inevitable, and some 
occurred after Katrina. 79 Spills not only contaminate water sup-
plies and wildlife habitat, but they also kill the very marsh vege-
72. TABB & MALONE, supra note 4, at 642. 
73. Dean & Revkin, supra note 9. 
74. Thomas, supra note 62, at 49 illus. (showing storm surge). 
75. I d. at 46. 
76. See generally, id. at 42-52. 
77. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 63, at 33-35. 
78. See Landrieu, supra note 33. 
79. See MEMBERS SCHOLARS OF THE CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL 
DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE KATRINA 17 (2005), available at http://www. 
progressiveregulation.org/articles/unnatural_Disaster_512.pdf. 
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tation that helps bind coastal wetlands against erosion.80 The vi-
cious cycle thus progresses: degrading wetlands makes oil pipe-
lines vulnerable to fracture, which further degrade the wetlands 
in which they are laid, making them even more vulnerable to 
fracture, and so on. 
In addition, coastal wetlands provide an important buffer 
against land-based marine pollution by filtering contaminants out 
of stormwater that passes over developed lands and into the 
Gulf.81 Fewer wetland water purification services means greater 
loads of pollutants enter coastal waters, adversely affecting the 
health of marine ecosystems and commercial harvests of oysters, 
shrimp, and the other species that form twenty-eight percent of 
the nation's total fishery yield. 82 Coastal wetlands also provide 
critical habitat for both land-based and marine species that breed 
and feed in coastal marshes83 and serve as nurseries for ninety-
six percent of all commercial species and fifty percent of recrea-
tionally fished species in the Gulf region.84 Half of all migratory 
water birds in North America use the Mississippi Flyway and de-
pend on the coastal marshes for sustenance during their jour-
ney.85 Moreover, the massive bedload that once replenished the 
Mississippi floodplain now flows directly into the Gulf of Mexico, 
which may create other hazards for reef ecosystems.86 
C. Coping with Coastal Land Loss 
If anything, the tragedy of New Orleans is not that the original 
European settlers could not have foreseen the results of the well-
intended flood control policies that they set in motion, but that 
the flood control managers of the late twentieth century could 
80. Houck, supra note 8, at 59-64. 
81. E.g., E.P.A., Wetlands, Functions and Values, http://www.epa.gov/water train/wet 
lands/module05.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
82. Houck, supra note 8, at 84-85. 
83. Viguerie, supra note 2, at 85. 
84. Houck, supra note 8, at 82. 
85. See id. 
86. Cf Robin Kundis Craig, Protecting International Marine Biodiversity: Interna-
tional Treaties and National Systems of Marine Protected Areas, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 333, 346 (2005) ("Land-based air pollution can ... acidify ocean waters, increase the 
concentration of heavy metals and other toxic pollutants in the oceans, and increase sedi-
mentation of the oceans, blocking sunlight, interfering with photosynthesis, and smother-
ing coastal ecosystems such as coral reef."). 
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foresee the problem, but were unable to take the necessary steps 
to reverse it. Indeed, a number of restoration programs have 
emerged over the last twenty years in response to Louisiana's 
coastal land loss crisis, although funding has not materialized at 
levels necessary to implement them on a meaningful scale. 
The Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration 
Act ("the CWPPRA"), also known as the "Breaux Act," was au-
thorized by Congress in 1990 to address wetland loss nationally 
with a primary focus on coastal Louisiana.87 The CWPPRA is ad-
ministered by a task force consisting of representatives from the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Interior, the 
Department of Agriculture and the Louisiana Governor's Office.88 
A total of 149 projects have been authorized through the 
CWPPRA since 1990, benefiting more than 135,000 acres of 
coastal wetlands.89 One promising experiment is the Caernarvon 
project, a $26 million demonstration project that enables carefully 
controlled flooding of adjacent delta wetlands.90 A massive gate in 
the side of a levee is periodically opened to release river waters 
rich with bedload over the wetland soils, enabling them to be re-
plenished with the sediment that has bypassed them for the last 
hundred years.91 However, Caernarvon's approach is of limited 
value in floodplain areas that have already been developed with 
homes and businesses. 
Accordingly, the State of Louisiana collaborated with several 
federal agencies in designing a strategic plan for coping with land 
loss on a more regional basis, Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable 
Coastal Louisiana. 92 The plan outlines seventy-seven ecosystem 
restoration strategies that are needed to protect and sustain the 
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 3952 (2000). 
88. Id. § 3951. 
89. Letter from Dr. Erik Zobrist, Director of the National Ocean and Atmospheric 
Administration's restoration efforts in Louisiana under the Coastal Wetlands, Planning, 
Protection and Restoration Act, to author (October 19, 2005) (on file with author) (provid-
ing information on current efforts to deal with the coastal land loss crisis in Louisiana). 
90. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey Nat'l Wetlands Res. Ctr., Caernarvon Pro-
ject Given an "A" by Coastal Specialists (Oct. 27, 1997), available at http://www.lacoast. 
gov/news/ press/1997 -10-27 .htm. 
91. See generally Nat'l Wetlands Res. Ctr., U.S. Geological Survey, Caernarvon 
Freshwater Diversion Project, http://www.lacoast.gov/programs/Caernarvon/factsheet.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
92. See Nat'l Wetlands Res. Ctr., U.S. Geological Survey Coast 2050, Project Overview 
(2004), http://www.coast2050.gov (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
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remainder of Louisiana's coastal wetlands. Construction costs of 
the Coast 2050 plan have been estimated at approximately ten 
times the annual level of CWPPRA spending, or $14 billion dol-
lars over the next thirty years.93 The Louisiana Coastal Area ("the 
LCA") Louisiana Ecosystem Restoration Study was initiated as 
the blueprint for implementing Coast 2050 restoration strategies 
into a series of large-scale projects for coastal Louisiana.94 In 
2003, however, the White House reduced funding for coastal pro-
tection programs in Louisiana. 95 
D. Lessons from Louisiana: Laterally Expansive Environmental 
Assessment 
What can we learn from this particularly dark demonstration 
of the Natural Resources Law of Unintended Consequences? For 
one thing, now that estimates for post-Katrina repairs have 
reached $200 billion,96 the $14 billion contemplated for the Coast 
2050 plan suddenly seems like a better deal.97 Thus, the first les-
son to take from the tragic flooding of New Orleans is the impor-
93. See Fischetti, supra note 55. 
94. See LOUISIANA COASTAL AREA, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, LOUISIANA 
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION STUDY (2004), available at http://data.lca.gov/lvan6/main/main 
_exec_ sum_toc.pdf. 
95. See Ron Fournier, Who Failed the People of New Orleans, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 1, 
2005, available at http://www.ksdk.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=84164 ("Just last 
year, the Army Corps of Engineers sought $105 million for hurricane and flood programs 
in New Orleans. The White House slashed the request to about $40 million. Congress fi-
nally approved $42.2 million, less than half of the agency's request."); Susan B. Glasser & 
Sash White, Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at A01 (not-
ing budget cuts for natural disaster response agencies); see also Thomas, supra note 62, at 
46. In 2004, a final LCA report was released that included five "near-term" critical resto-
ration initiatives and additional funding for research and feasibility studies. LOUISIANA 
COASTAL AREA, supra note 94, at viii. In addition, the Water Resources Development Act 
(the "WRDA") is the primary mechanism through which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
is funded for conducting flood control, navigation and environmental restoration projects. 
See Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, §§ 101-112, 114 Stat. 
2572, 2572-87 (authorizing water resources as development and conservation and other 
projects). The Act is typically reauthorized on a four-year basis. In 2000, the WRDA pro-
vided a fifty percent federal cost-share for the $7.8 billion Comprehensive Everglades Res-
toration Plan. See id. § 601(e), 114 Stat. at 2684. Funding for the LCA program has not 
been forthcoming, however, as Congress failed to pass WRDA legislation in 2004. See S. 
2773, lOth Cong. (2004); [103th Congress) Cong. Index (CCH) 20,526 (Dec. 30, 2004) 
(showing that the statutes of S.2773 never passed placement on the senate calendar); see 
also Letter from Dr. Erik Zobrist, NOAA, to author, supra note 89. 
96. Howard Fineman, Money, Money, Everywhere, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005, at 27. 
97. That said, Katrina would certainly have caused some damage even if the coastal 
wetlands had been intact, so these figures cannot be considered mutually exclusive. 
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tance of accounting for the true value of ecosystem services, such 
as the flood control protection offered by coastal wetlands, in the 
cost-benefit analyses that are now customary in natural resource 
management. An earlier investment in protecting Gulf Coast 
wetlands might have paid substantial dividends in reducing the 
scope of post-Katrina flood damage. 
However, the primary lesson from Louisiana's experience is to 
avoid making important natural resource management decisions 
in the vacuum of old-fashioned, single-issue natural resource 
management. Measured both by our ability to understand the 
complex nature of ecosystems and our capacity to alter them, we 
have outgrown the comfortable but false isolation of single-issue 
management. The Louisiana story teaches the importance of lat-
erally expansive natural resource planning: planning that consid-
ers the reverberations of management strategies beyond the sin-
gle resource management objective and throughout the affected 
regional ecosystem. Mter all, it defeats the purpose of a flood con-
trol program if preventing the river's seasonal flooding merely 
leads to catastrophic flooding of an even less predictable sort. 
Indeed, the importance of broader natural resource planning 
was recognized in 1970, when the National Environmental Policy 
Act ("NEPA") was enacted by overwhelming bipartisan majorities 
in both houses of Congress, requiring that government decisions 
be taken with an informed and long-term view toward environ-
mental consequences.98 Under NEPA, a federal actor considering 
an action that might have negative consequences for the envi-
ronment must first assess whether potential environmental im-
pacts might reach a designated threshold of "significance."99 If 
significant environmental impacts are likely, the actor must then 
analyze the potential consequences and consider alternatives that 
might pose lesser impacts in an Environmental Impact State-
ment.100 Although NEPA requires time and resource-consuming 
analysis, it has been accredited as the most successful environ-
mental law in the history of the world, altering the very culture of 
government towards greater accountability and long-term plan-
98. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2000). 
100. ld. 
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ning, and has been imitated by nearly half of all American states 
and many other nations. 101 
It goes without saying that the French settlers who built the 
first levee in 1718 may not have appreciated alluvial river hy-
drology in all the glory that we do now, and the state of the sci-
ence might not have enabled nineteenth-century flood control en-
gineers to foresee the unintended consequences to coastal 
wetlands even had they been subject to NEPA's planning re-
quirements.102 Still, the science certainly caught up with the prob-
lems well before Katrina fully exposed New Orleans's vulnerabil-
ity, and the failure to adequately explore countervailing measures 
is a more culpable natural resource management choice.103 Dis-
putes over levee management decisions by the Army Corps after 
NEPA's passage reveal continuing concern over the quality of en-
vironmental assessment that accompanied management of the 
Mississippi104 (although, even if additional planning missteps 
came later, the critical management decisions that doomed the 
Gulf Coast wetlands-those to fully channelize the River-had 
already been made). 
101. See Oliver A. Houck, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 173, 173-74 (2000) (reviewing 
LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: AN AGENDA FOR 
THE FuTuRE (1998)) (noting that NEPA is both "the most successful environmental law in 
the world" and the most imitated-but also the most disappointing, to the extent that its 
procedural mandate lacks substantive teeth). 
102. The bulk of the Mississippi River Flood efforts took place in the late nineteenth 
century, long before passage ofNEPA. See McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 53. NEPA 
was signed into law on January 1, 1970. See Task Force on Improving the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, History in Brief (NEPA), http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/ 
nepataskforcelhistory.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
103. For example, Houck, supra note 8, described the crisis of Louisiana's coastal land 
loss, its causes, and implications with frightening accuracy in 1983. There is almost noth-
ing we know now that we did not know then, yielding almost twenty-five years of opportu-
nity to forestall the consequences that have now befallen New Orleans. 
104. See Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, 424 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. La. 1976). In this 
case, the Army Corps of Engineers was enjoined from proceeding with a flood control man-
agement strategy that failed to meet NEPA's requirements for environmental assessment. 
Rather than complete the environmental assessment as required by the statute, the Army 
Corps decided not to proceed on the proposed plan. Following Katrina, the case became a 
rallying cry among opponents of NEPA, who argue that the delay and expense associated 
with required environmental assessment helped contribute to the flooding of New Orleans 
by interfering with the Corps' ability to efficiently implement a new management plan. 
Advocates for NEPA counter that the fault lies with the Army Corps for opting to discon-
tinue planning rather than comply with the law. Indeed, considering the history presented 
here of poorly planned management strategies in the Mississippi Delta, it seems all the 
more important that environmental assessment be performed to the highest standard of 
care. 
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But now that we understand the relationship between coastal 
wetland flood control services and river channelization, we cer-
tainly cannot allow ourselves to make this particular mistake 
again. New Orleans's example stands as a cautionary tale to mo-
tivate more careful assessment and decision-making in other 
management realms that implicate cross-media or regional eco-
systemic relationships (for example, the potential relationship be-
tween air pollution and sea level rise, as mediated by climate 
change, or the relationship between municipally regulated land 
uses and federally regulated stormwater pollution). Moreover, the 
tragic flooding of New Orleans offers heart-rending testimony to 
the continued importance of heeding the long-term consequences 
of resource management choices that are easy to miss in the heat 
of short-term problem-solving efforts. Although costly investment 
in Coast 2050's restoration projects may have seemed less benefi-
cial than simply maintaining the levees in 2003, Katrina cer-
tainly revealed the "penny-wise, pound-foolish" nature of that de-
cision. 
The tale of Louisiana's lost wetlands thus highlights the impor-
tance of thinking progressively through the lateral ecosystemic 
consequences of policy decisions. This is a natural resources 
planning goal toward which the environmental review process 
under NEPA aspires; indeed, NEPA and other natural resource 
planning laws that require policymakers to reflect on future envi-
ronmental consequences105 have forestalled countless indirect but 
foreseeable catastrophes that might have followed from single-
issue planning.106 
Nevertheless, as this piece goes to press, a Congressional Task 
Force is proposing that Congress streamline NEPA by reducing 
its assessment requirements. 107 At the very time that the cau-
105. In addition to the many state statutes modeled after NEPA, other natural re-
source planning statutes include directives in the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1452(3); the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a); the Federal 
Land Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1712; the National Wildlife Refuge Improve-
ment Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd; and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act, 16 U.S.C. 1853(a). 
106. See ROBERT G. DREHER, NEPA UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICAL AsSAULT ON THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 5-7 (2005), available at http://www.law.george 
town.edu/gelpi/news/documents/NEPA UnderSiegeFinal_OOO. pdf. 
107. The House of Representatives Committee on Resources is currently considering 
recommendations by its NEPA task forces to expand exemptions from NEPA review, limit 
citizen-standing to raise legal challenges under NEPA, limit the scope of alternatives 
analyses, and limit the consideration of cumulative impacts. See H.R. COMM. ON RES., 
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tionary tales from New Orleans and the Chesapeake herald the 
importance of more thorough environmental assessment, it would 
be ironic if federal requirements for environmental assessment 
were weakened in the primary federal natural resources planning 
statute. 
Still, even NEPA exempts actions taken solely to protect the 
environment, making them potentially more vulnerable to the 
Law of Unintended Consequences if the management efforts are 
taken for no other purpose than environmental protection. Such 
would have been the case, for example, in the Chesapeake wet-
lands preservation plan that is the protagonist in the other of our 
tale of two wetlands. The Chesapeake tale further suggests that 
conventional environmental assessment may not be enough to 
identify foreseeable but unintended consequences in any event. 
Thus, effective natural resources planning must continue to 
evolve, even if it must do so independently ofNEPA. To avoid un-
intended consequences, smart planners may need to press as-
sessment beyond the statutory minimum and toward best prac-
tices that will better advance long-term management goals. 
Ill. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND THE CHESAPEAKE: THE 
INADVERTENT DEPLETION OF PROTECTED TIDAL WETLANDS 
The lost Louisiana wetlands demonstrates the instability of 
single-issue natural resource management, where all attention 
was focused on the management of the river and none spared for 
the consequences of the changed river dynamics on the rest of the 
natural system. Such an accident in policymaking may be forgiv-
able as a vestige of history before the modern era of earth science 
and environmental assessment. Nevertheless, the Chesapeake 
story demonstrates that we remain vulnerable to the Natural Re-
sources Law of Unintended Consequences even in our state of 
relative natural resource planning sophistication. 
109TH GONG., TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND 
TASK FORCE ON UPDATING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, INITIAL FINDINGS 
AND DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS, 26-29 (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://resourcescom 
mittee.house.gov/nepataskforce/report/nepareport_finaldraft.pdf. These recommendations 
are currently in the forty-five-day period allocated for public comment; they have not yet 
been adopted by the Committee. !d. at 1. If adopted, these amendments would signifi-
cantly weaken the quality of long-term environmental assessment required under the 
statute. 
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When policymakers began to recognize the importance of wet-
lands in the late 1970s, they championed a number of natural re-
source management policies to afford greater protections for those 
wetlands that still remained after centuries of development-
induced destruction. 108 Many states, including Virginia, passed 
wetlands management programs that sought to minimize the im-
pact of human activities on tidal wetlands, often by restricting 
the ability of landowners to build structures within the desig-
nated boundaries of such wetlands. 109 
Unlike the nineteenth-century flood control efforts on the Mis-
sissippi, the natural resource managers who designed these laws 
were thinking ecosystemically, especially about the important 
role played by wetlands in buffering the margin between terres-
trial and aquatic systems. They had already learned the lesson 
demonstrated more recently by New Orleans's cautionary tale, 
and yet even their more laterally expansive natural resource 
planning led them unknowingly toward an unforeseen (although 
foreseeable) tragic error. Although they had considered the inter-
play between the components of the regional Chesapeake Bay 
ecosystem, what they had not quite thought through was the way 
the system would behave over time, and how intervention by fac-
tors from the remote corners of the system might lead to unin-
tended consequences. 
A. Saving the Bay by Protecting the Wetlands 
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the United 
States, spanning more than 4500 square miles within 11,700 
miles of coastline (more than the entire West Coast)Y0 The Bay 
"supports more than 3600 species of plants, fish and animals, in-
cluding 348 species of finfish, 173 species of shellfish and over 
2700 plant species," and "produces 500 million pounds of seafood" 
each year. 111 The Chesapeake is also "home to 29 species ofwater-
fowl and is a major resting ground along the Atlantic Migratory 
108. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.§§ 28.2-1301 to -1320 (2004). 
109. See, e.g., id. §§ 28.2-1302, -1306, -1308. 
110. ERNST, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
111. Chesapeake Bay Program, About the Chesapeake Bay-Bay Factoids, http:// 
www.chesapeakebay.net/info/factoids.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
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Bird Flyway," hosting one million waterfowl every winter. 112 Two 
of the five major North Atlantic ports in the United States, Bal-
timore and Hampton Roads, are located within the Bay.113 
The Chesapeake is overtly appreciated as a commercial and 
recreational resource for the fifteen million people who live within 
its watershed.114 Still, the Bay remains in ecological crisis even 
twenty years after serious natural resource management efforts 
were undertaken to reverse the ever-growing "dead zone" in the 
Bay: the region so polluted that it lacks sufficient oxygen to sus-
tain marine life.115 Over the last four decades, the volume of an-
oxic water in the Bay has more than tripled. 116 In 2005, forty-one 
percent of the main Bay (approximately 250 square miles) had too 
little oxygen to support marine life. 117 
In 1983, the first Chesapeake Bay Agreement established the 
Chesapeake Bay Program, a voluntary government partnership 
among Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, the District of Colum-
bia, the Chesapeake Bay Commission, and the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, to manage Bay restoration efforts. 118 
However, the factors that led to the dead zone have been hard to 
manage away. 
The largest contributor to the dead zone is non-point source 
pollution, or contaminants that are washed off the ground and 
into waterways from various land uses on lawns, farms, roads, 
parking lots, and businesses.U9 Pollutants like fertilizer, pesti-
cides, and animal waste fuel the excessive growth of algae that 
then starves the oxygen content of the water needed to sustain 
112. ld. 
113. Id. 
114. ERNST, supra note 6, at 17. 
115. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, The Chesapeake Bay's Dead Zone, http://www. 
cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resources_facts_deadzone (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
116. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, The Chesapeake Bay's Dead Zone, http://www. 
cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resources_facts_deadzone mainstem ("The Problem in 
the Mainstem") (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
117. Scott Harper, Chesapeake Bay Again Receives a Grade of "D," VIRGINIAN-PILOT 
(Norfolk, Va.), Nov. 14, 2005, at B1; Letter from Dr. Kirk Havens, Assistant Director, Cen-
ter for Coastal Resources Management, Virginia Institute of Marine Science, to author 
(March 13, 2006) (on file with author) (confirming 250 square mile figure). 
118. Cynthia J. Aukerman, Agricultural Diffuse Pollution Controls: Lessons for Scot-
land from the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 191, 246 (2004). 
119. ld. at 221-26. 
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other marine life/20 while contamination by motor oils, chemicals, 
and even tailpipe emissions from automobiles, which enter air 
currents and eventually fall into the Bay,121 create a toxic envi-
ronment unable to sustain any life at all. Demonstrating that one 
size never fits all in natural resource management, the very 
movement of sediments needed to sustain the coastal Louisiana 
wetlands is an increasingly understood source of the Chesa-
peake's woes, as sediment from coastal erosion, urban develop-
ment, and agricultural land uses enters and clouds Bay waters 
such that sunlight cannot penetrate to the food-chain supporting 
grasses on the Bay floor. 122 The oyster population that once 
helped to filter contaminants from the waters began to collapse in 
1880, devastating the commercial oyster fishery and compound-
ing the Bay's pollution problems.123 
Why such a rapid decline? Part of the reason was that there 
were more contaminants associated with increased land-based 
development. 124 But another reason was that the margin between 
the contaminating land uses and the waters of the Bay-the wet-
lands-had been decimated by the same development. 125 Though 
providing the critical regional ecosystem services of flood control, 
pollution mitigation, and habitat for commercially, recreationally, 
and intrinsically important biodiversity, marshes make for unde-
sirable real estate. They are too soggy to support structures, and 
so are often filled to allow firm support of structural foundations. 
To many landowners, vegetated wetlands are not as visually at-
120. Id. at 227-28. 
121. Chesapeake Bay Program, Bay FAQ, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
122. Aukerman, supra note 118, at 197-98. 
123. ld. at 202-03 (discussing the collapse of the oyster population); Craig, supra note 
86, at 352 (explaining the effect on oysters' filtering capabilities). 
124. Still, efforts to curtail the march of contaminants into the Bay have not been 
wholly unsuccessful. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation pointed out in its 2005 Annual 
"State of the Bay" Report that, in the last forty years, the human population in the water-
shed has doubled, doubling the automobile traffic and sewage production and claiming 
nearly half the available open space for development-but the state of the Bay remained 
in a relatively constant, if miserable, state over the same period of time. While a forty-one 
percent dead zone is nothing to celebrate, we can at least note that the Bay did not dete-
riorate to a state twice as bad over the same period of time, and that efforts to halt the de-
cline have met with some success. See Harper, supra note 117 (citing CHESAPEAKE BAY 
FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE BAY 2005 REPORT 2 (2005), available at http://www.cbf.org/ 
site/DocServer/sotb2005/sotb2005lores.pdf?DOCID=4564. 
125. See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to 
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1281 
(1998) (noting that the land between development and the Bay is receding). 
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tractive as the water's edge itself, and so they hardened wetlands 
with sea walls, bulkheads, and rock structures to produce a clean 
boundary line at the edge of coastal land.126 As Chesapeake Bay 
Program participants came to realize the importance of wetlands 
protection as a management tool for resurrecting the Bay, state 
natural resource managers struggled to determine the best way 
to protect what wetlands were left against further destruction 
while finding a way to respect the investment-backed expecta-
tions of private property owners with bayside lands. 
In 1972, the Commonwealth of Virginia passed a tidal wetlands 
management program127 that sought to minimize the impact of 
human activities on these wetlands by mandating that the con-
struction of structures in tidal areas take place, to the maximum 
extent possible, outside of the wetlands. 128 The law attempted to 
compromise between the legitimate expectations of landowners to 
protect and control their private property while providing protec-
tions for the wetlands at the edges of private property that serve 
public interests under Virginia's public trust doctrine. 129 The 
common law public trust doctrine has historically protected pub-
lic interests in navigable waters, especially the right of access.130 
However, Virginia is one of several states that have constitution-
alized even broader protections for the public interests in water, 
waterways, and other natural resources, as set forth in Article XI, 
Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution: 
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use 
and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, waters and 
other natural resources, it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth 
to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources, its public 
lands, and its historic and cultural sites and buildings. Further, it 
shall be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, 
and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the bene-
fit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the Common-
wealth.131 
126. Interview with Carlton Hershner, Jr., Dir., Ctr. for Coastal Res. Mgmt., Va. Inst. 
of Marine Scis., and Kirk Havens, Assistant Dir., Ctr. for Coastal Res. Mgmt., Va. lnst. of 
Marine Scis., in Gloucester, Va. (Nov. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Hershner & Havens]. 
127. Act of Apr. 10, 1972, ch. 711, 1972 Va. Acts 989. 
128. VA. CODE ANN.§ 28.2-1303 (2005). 
129. The tidal wetlands program is administered by the Marine Resources Commis-
sion. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 28.2-1301 to -1320 (2005). 
130. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (recognizing the Ameri-
can reception of the common law public trust doctrine). 
131. VA. CONST. art. XI,§ 1. 
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Article XI, Section 2, addresses conservation and development, as 
well as the role of the General Assembly in "the furtherance of 
such policy."132 
Accordingly, much research and a huge state survey of inter-
tidal wetland service function was brought to bear on establishing 
a scientifically meaningful basis for the jurisdictional boundary of 
the law, or how much wetland upland from the water's edge 
would receive protection. In the end, policymakers defined the 
upper limit of vegetated wetlands in the Code of Virginia as "one 
and one-halftimes the mean tide range."133 In other words, in the 
range of wetland that extended upland one and one-half times the 
mean tide range above the average low water point, no develop-
ment could occur without a special state permit.134 Beyond that 
jurisdictional line, landowners could build structures or harden 
shorelines without seeking regulatory permission135 (and, in fact, 
many permits were granted to allow structures within the juris-
dictional boundary). 136 
B. The Unforeseen (Yet Foreseeable) Contingency 
The law was a hard-won compromise, forged in the clash be-
tween landowners who sought complete freedom to develop to the 
edge of the water and others who sought even more serious pro-
tection for the public interest in the wetlands at the margin. As-
suming that permits to build within the jurisdictional boundary 
were not too forthcoming, it might have been an optimal compro-
mise between such important competing interests. Private prop-
erty rights were respected, and the most valuable wetland zones 
had been identified and were afforded protection. At least, it 
would have been an optimal compromise-if it were really true 
132. Id. art. XI, § 2. 
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1300 (2004) ("'Vegetated wetlands' means lands lying be-
tween and contiguous to mean low water and an elevation above mean low water equal to 
the factor one and one-halftimes the mean tide range at the site of the proposed project in 
the county, city, or town in question ... "). 
134. ld. § 28.2-1302 (4.A.) (2004) ("Any person who desires to use or develop any wet-
land within this [county, city, or town], other than for the purpose of conducting the activi-
ties specified in § 3 of this ordinance, shall first file an application for a permit directly 
with the wetlands board or with the Commission."). 
135. See id. 
136. Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
2006] LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 1009 
that the most valuable wetland zones had actually been identified 
and were afforded protection. The problem, as it turns out, is that 
they had not been properly identified, and were accordingly left 
vulnerable. 137 It was not because the massive survey and research 
effort deployed to establish the mean-high tide metric had been 
flawed; it was unassailable in its measurements at the time. But 
times change, and this is what the policymakers missed: the laws 
were crafted without considering the dynamic nature of intertidal 
wetlands over time. Even in the three decades that followed the 
new policy, significant wetland acreage has been lost, and we now 
understand that all wetlands in the protected zone are at risk of 
disappearing as an unforeseen result ofthis policy. 138 
The problem is essentially this: the regulatory plan assumed 
that the tidal wetlands designated for protection would always be 
located where they were measured in the initial statewide sur-
veys between 1969 and 1977,139 but we now understand that this 
is simply not the case. Instead, wetlands migrate across the land 
surface in geologic time with fluctuations in land subsidence and 
sea level, always occupying the upper intertidal zone at the mar-
gin of the sea and land.140 The law tried to protect the intertidal 
zone as measured in the 1960s and 1970s, and the short term re-
sult was a promising reduction in the amount of construction pro-
posed for these wetlands. 141 But an additional consequence was 
an acceleration of the construction by landowners of shoreline 
protection structures just landward of the jurisdictional boundary 
protecting then-existing wetlands. 142 As aforementioned, land-
owners tend to desire a clear boundary at the edges of their 
yards, and a hard structure to prevent coastal erosion at the edge 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. M.L. Wass & T.D. Wright, Coastal Wetlands of Virginia, 1st Interim Report, Spe-
cial Report No. 10 (Va. Inst. of Marine Sci. 1969), available at http://www.vims.edu/Grey 
Lit!VIMS.html; J.D. Boon & M.P. Lynch, Tidal Datum Planes and Tidal Boundaries and 
Their Use as Legal Boundaries: A Study with Recommendations for Virginia, Special Re-
port in APPLIED MARINE SCIENCE AND OCEAN ENGINEERING, No. 22 (Va. Inst. of Marine 
Sci. 1972); K. Marcellus, Coastal Wetlands of Virginia: Interim Report No. 2, Special Re-
port in APPLIED MARINE SCIENCE AND OCEAN ENGINEERING, No. 27 (Virginia Institute of 
Marine Science 1972), available at http://vims.edu/GreyLit!VIMS.html; J.D. Boon III, M.E. 
Boule, & G.M. Silberhorn, Delineation of Tidal Wetlands Boundaries in Lower Chesapeake 
Bay and Its Tributaries, Special Report No. 140 in APPLIED MARINE SCIENCE AND OCEAN 
ENGINEERING (Va. Inst. of Marine Sci. 1977). 
140. E.g., Titus, supra note 10, at 719. 
141. Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
142. Id. 
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of the sea. So a plethora of bulkheads, sea walls, and revetments 
were constructed just inside the line of protected wetlands. 
This would be harmless enough, if the protected wetlands 
would only observe the jurisdictional boundary so meticulously 
set by the legislature. And yet stubbornly, and with apparent to-
tal disregard for the hard work of legislators and natural resource 
managers alike, they did not. Why not? Because, just as stub-
bornly, sea levels have been rising. 143 Indeed, the background 
level of sea rise is approximately one foot per century, but in the 
Chesapeake region of Virginia, it has risen a foot since 1972.144 
Even that would not be the end of the wetlands, which are de-
signed in nature to accommodate changes in the overall system 
over time. 145 Unimpeded, wetlands will accrete vertically from the 
soil level up to accommodate gradual rises in sea-level, which his-
torically rise at the rate of about a foot per century. 146 However, 
the hardening of the shoreline locks up the seaward movement of 
sediments necessary to support the natural process of wetland 
vertical accretion. 147 When shorelines are stabilized this way, it 
impedes the ability of wetlands to replenish themselves against 
coastal erosion and rising tides. Worse, there is a limit to how fast 
marshes can accrete vertically in the face of sea level rise, and the 
sea level is now rising faster than the wetlands can accrete.148 
Even so, wetlands can also adjust to the rising sea level by mi-
grating laterally upland, maintaining an approximately stable 
buffer between the aquatic and terrestrial environment.149 As sea 
level rises, the water content in soil just upland from the mean 
high tide level rises, converting to the hydric soil that supports 
characteristically wetland plant life. The plants already present 
are able to colonize the new land-side wetland soil even as the 
vegetation colonizing the tide-side soil is drowned by salt-water 
143. E.g., Houck, supra note 8 at 14 (noting that sea levels are rising globally this cen-
tury at a rate of 1.2 mm per year); Titus, supra note 10, at 718-19. 
144. J.D. BOON, III, SECRETS OF THE TIDE: TIDE AND TIDAL CURRENT ANALYSIS AND 
APPLICATIONS, STORM SURGES AND SEA LEVEL TRENDS 130 (Horwood Publishing Ltd. 
2004); Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
145. See Titus, supra note 10, at 718-19. 
146. Id. But see Titus, supra note 10, at 718 (stating that global warming could cause 
the sea level to rise up to two feet per century). 
147. See, e.g., Titus, supra note 10, at 719. 
148. See Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
149. E.g., Titus, supra note 10, at 719. 
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inundation.150 In this way, the formerly land-side terrestrial 
boundary becomes part of the wetland, the former tide-side wet-
land becomes part of the sea, and the wetland barrier that buffers 
the terrestrial-aquatic boundary is maintained.151 This is how 
wetlands migrate over the surface of the land over time, and 
there is evidence of this kind of progression taking place in Vir-
ginia a number of times in the geological record.152 
However, the protected Chesapeake wetlands have nowhere to 
go now that they are bounded on the upland side by hardened 
structures like the bulkheads dutifully built on the legal side of 
the jurisdictional boundary. Now, as sea levels rise, the water 
level and water table move upland and hit a solid wall. Plants 
cannot colonize beyond the hardened structure. The water moves 
upland, saturating and then inundating the wetland soils, drown-
ing the wetland vegetation, and the buffer zone has nowhere to 
migrate. 153 It is gradually drowned under the rising sea, and sim-
ply disappears. 
Dr. Carl Hershner, Director of the Center for Coastal Re-
sources Management at the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences 
(''VIMS"), recalls working on the original wetlands protection 
strategy, and its ironic consequences: 
When the Virginia wetland law was passed in 1972, no thought was 
given to the way that wetlands move over time, or the way that sea 
level changes over time. Our focus was on how important the wet-
lands were to the health of the Chesapeake's waters, not on how they 
would change over time ... 
At the time, the big battle was with private property owners over 
new regulation on private lands that abut low water areas. It was 
only with the "No Net Loss" policies of the 1980s that attention be-
gan turning to how wetlands work over time. We weren't thinking 
about climate change back then, but the background level of sea 
level rise began to attract attention in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, when landowners began calling the State to report that their 
wetlands [those beyond the hardened edges of their property] were 
disappearing. Then we realized that there is a natural cycle of wet-
land loss and regeneration that follows the cycle of terrestrial-
aquatic boundary shift ... 
150. See generally WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES G. GoSSELINK, WETLANDS 261-305 (3d 
ed. 2000) (describing the salt marsh ecosystem). 
151. See id. at 269. 
152. Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
153. See, e.g., Titus, supra note 10, at 726. 
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We knew to think about the wetlands as ecological service utilities, 
providing flood control, habitat, and buffering pollution from enter-
ing the Bay-but we didn't know to think about their dynamics over 
time. Now the wetlands that we measured in the 1970s are disap-
pearing into the sea, thanks to the widespread shoreline hardening 
inspired by our early attempt to protect them. 154 
Indeed, between 1993 and 2004, another 229 miles of shoreline 
were armored with new erosion control structures permitted un-
der the program, approximately equivalent to the length of thir-
teen Chesapeake Bay Bridge Tunnels laid end to end.155 (See 
graphic at Appendix I, page 1026.) Researchers with the Compre-
hensive Coastal Inventory Program at VIMS have shown that 
twenty-five percent of the Maryland shoreline has already been 
hardened in a way that will prevent lateral movement by tidal 
wetlands.156 
C. Better Shoreline Stabilization Strategies 
Alarmed by these figures, natural resource managers have 
scrambled to articulate better programs for shoreline protection 
that balance the need to protect property against coastal erosion 
with the importance of preserving healthy connections among 
sea, wetlands, and uplands and that allow for preservation of the 
system in the face of geomorphological changes like sea rise and 
land subsidence. 
The result is the "Living Shoreline" model of shoreline stabili-
zation, which promotes natural shoreline systems that can pro-
tect themselves against incremental changes in sea level. The 
Living Shoreline is designed to enable the wetland to remain 
ecologically connected to both the terrestrial and the aquatic sys-
154. Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
155. Karen Duhring, Annual Summary of Permitted Tidal Wetlands lmpacts-2004, 20 
THE VIRGINIA WETLANDS REPORT 1 (Va. lnst. of Marine Sci. 2005), available at http:// 
ccrm.vims.edu/vwr/VWR%202005%20Spring.pdf; see Appendix I at page 1026, Center for 
Coastal Resources Management (Va. Inst. of Marine Sci. 2005) (reproduced courtesy of the 
Center for Coastal Resources Management, Virginia Institute of Marine Science). 
156. Letter from Dr. Marcia Berman, Director, Comprehensive Coastal Inventory Pro-
gram, Va. Inst. of Marine Sci., to author (Nov. 10, 2005) (on file with author) (providing 
data from forthcoming study indicating twenty-five percent figure); Letter from Dr. Kirk 
Havens, Assistant Director, Center for Coastal Resources Management, Va. Inst. of Ma-
rine Sci., to author (Mar. 16, 2006) (on file with author) (confirming twenty-five percent 
figure). 
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terns that maintain them (and which they, in turn, help main-
tain).157 (See graphic at Appendix II, page 1027 .) 
For example, in place of bulkheads and sea walls, the Living 
Shoreline model advocates use of a relatively new design of shore-
line stabilization, the "marsh toe revetment."158 A marsh toe re-
vetment is a stone and wood structure positioned between the sea 
and the marsh (rather than between the marsh and the land, as 
traditional landward revetments are) that protects against 
coastal erosion by reflecting wave action back toward the sea, but 
allows movement of water through the revetment and the marsh, 
and movement of marsh upland as necessary with sea level 
rise.159 (See images at Appendices III and IV, pages 1028-1029.) 
The marsh toe revetment thus provides shoreline stabilization 
services without removing the wetland from the natural systems 
to which it is tethered. Sea level rise would eventually require re-
positioning of some structural components, but the design allows 
for easy reconfiguration, and the wetland is enabled to move with 
changing conditions. Scientists at VIMS are currently research-
ing the minimum size of an effective marsh toe revetment in vari-
ous configurations in order to provide building standards that can 
be easily reproduced by coastal landowners in all circumstances. 
The Living Shoreline guarantees neither complete protection 
for wetlands nor complete protection against coastal erosion, but 
it is a preferable model over more static traditional stabilization 
strategies, which guarantee the eventual loss of tidal wetlands 
and the valuable ecosystem services they provide under condi-
tions of sea level rise. A more ambitious strategy advocated by 
some coastal resource managers is to couple the Living Shoreline 
model with a policy of planned "Strategic Retreat," in which we 
allow sea level to proceed unmitigated into undeveloped areas 
and move to protect the wetlands that will be established at the 
157. See Tom Barnard, Preserving the Bay's Living Shorelines: A Growing Grass-Roots 
Effort, 19 THE VIRGINIA WETLANDS REPORT 2 (Va. Inst. of Marine Sci. 2004), available at 
http://ccrm.vims.edu/vwrNWR2004Summer.pdf; Interview with Hershner & Havens, su-
pra note 126; see also Appendix II at page 1027 (reproduced courtesy of the Center for 
Coastal Resources Management, Virginia Institute of Marine Science). 
158. Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
159. Id. Photographs of conventional and marsh toe revetments, courtesy of the Center 
for Coastal Resources Management, Virginia Institute of Marine Science. See Appendices 
III and IV at pages 1028-29. 
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new tidal boundary. 160 According to Hershner, we now know 
enough about sea level rise to predict where marshes are going, 
or to identify the terrestrial areas that will become valuable salt 
marshes in the future, so long as the wetland margin is not pre-
vented from moving there by shoreline hardening.161 Hershner 
proposes that Louisiana purchase such terrestrial lands now, pre-
serve them as state parks, and allow the beaches to go to salt 
marsh wetlands over time. 162 
D. Lessons from the Chesapeake: Temporally and Causally 
Expansive Environmental Assessment 
The Louisiana story betrays the mirage of single-issue natural 
resource management, suggesting that environmental review be 
expanded laterally as necessary to account for impacts that might 
ripple through the distant but joined parts of an ecosystem as 
broad as the Mississippi watershed and delta lands.163 But the 
Chesapeake natural resource managers had progressed well be-
yond single-issue management. Their management strategy ex-
pressly considered the relationships within the complex regional 
Bay ecosystem, and sought to prevent undesirable changes (spe-
cifically, wetlands degradation) from redounding negatively 
throughout the rest of the system. However, the unintended con-
sequences wrought in the Chesapeake story suggest that natural 
resource managers must take even further steps to anticipate 
how a proposal will reverberate through the complex adaptive 
ecosystem. In the Chesapeake scenario, it was not enough to sim-
ply map the potential impacts of the proposed wetlands policy for-
ward in time; this alone could not have averted the acceleration 
160. Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. W.J. Neal, et al., Managed 
Retreat, in M.L. SCHWARTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COASTAL SCIENCE 602-06 (Springer 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2005). The State of North Carolina follows the planned stra-
tegic retreat model. When a coastal storm causes a North Carolina landowner to lose 
more than fifty percent of her property, that landowner must "retreat," and cannot re-
build structures in the jurisdictional coastal zone. The policy is designed to prevent 
private and public overinvestment in unmaintainable properties, and to avoid the 
hazard or marine pollution by overtaking inundated septic systems. See Nat'! Oceanic 
& Atmospheric Admin., Social and Demographic Trends that Affect the Need for Beach 
Nourishment, http://www3.csc.noaa.gov/beachnourishmentlhtmV human/socio/change.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
161. Interview with Hershner & Havens, supra note 126. 
162. Id. 
163. See supra Part III. 
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in wetland loss inadvertently hastened by the policy. To have 
avoided these unintended consequences, resource managers 
needed to think outside the box of traditional, forward-looking re-
view. They needed to recognize what other causal factors might 
intervene in their strategy from the remote corners of the net-
work, and in unanticipated sequences. 
Traditional environmental assessment starts from the pro-
posed action and traces all possible impacts forward in time from 
that action. What degree of attenuation the review must reach 
remains a point of debate, 164 but the model is uncontroversially 
linear, and in the forward direction only: review starts with the 
action and maps out the significant consequences that might flow 
from that action. The Chesapeake story demonstrates that, in 
some natural resource contexts, forward linear review is not 
enough, and that it may also be necessary to perform that causal 
analysis in the opposite direction. 
In a complex adaptive system, 165 causal interplay may arise be-
tween components in sequences that defy a simple line drawn 
forward in time. Rather than simply asking what impacts the 
proposed action might have on other system components, the ad-
ditional question becomes: what system components might im-
pact the proposed action, such as might cause it to backfire? 
For example, asking "what impacts might the proposed wet-
lands regulation have on other system components?" would never 
have called available data about rising sea level to mind; there is 
no way in which the wetland protective strategy could be seen as 
causing sea levels to rise. What was needed was for someone to 
ask the question, "what will happen under this policy given the 
incremental rate of sea level rise?" But in contrast to the present 
day, sea level rise was not a subject of common conversation. Al-
though data detailing background rates of sea level rise were 
available, no one thought to test the proposed strategy against 
such data. 
What model of assessment might have helped the Chesapeake 
natural resource managers connect these critical dots, such as 
164. For example, the House NEPA Task Forces recommend that attenuation be more 
limited than it is under current law, H.R. COMM. ON RESOURCES, supra note 107, at 28-29. 
I suggest that the Louisiana story counsels greater attenuation, at least across interven-
ing but related ecosystem processes, supra at pp. 19-20. 
165. See supra notes 13-14. 
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might have avoided the very wetland loss that their strategy was 
designed to prevent? 
IV. TOWARD A "NETWORK" MODEL OF EXPANDED 
ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT 
The Chesapeake story illustrates the problem of natural re-
source planning amidst the complex nature of regional ecosys-
tems, characterized by causal interplay between remote network 
components that defy linear assessment. What is needed is a 
model of environmental assessment capable of tracking the net-
work interplay within ecosystems, that would, for example, help 
the Chesapeake natural resource managers connect the problem 
of sea level rise to their proposed wetlands protective strategy. 
Fortunately for natural resource planning, such a model already 
exists in the realm of consumer products manufacturing. 
Natural resource planning could learn from the kind of caus-
ally ambidextrous assessment that regularly accompanies the de-
velopment of such consumer products as automobiles and com-
puter software. When designing a new car, the manufacturer 
engages in a rigorous assessment of how the vehicle will interact 
with the world in service of its goal (usually safe transportation). 
But the manufacturer does not limit its inquiry to the impacts the 
car will have on the world; it also asks how the world might im-
pact the car. When test models are discovered to react in undesir-
able ways to foreseeable stimuli (e.g., if the air bag deploys when-
ever the car taps the bumper of another during parking), their 
designs are taken back to the drawing board.166 Though an 
unlikely source of learning, natural resource planning might 
stand to benefit from this more causally sophisticated model of 
assessment. Where traditional environmental review asks: "what 
about the world might my proposed action 'break'?," causally ex-
panded review adds the critical inquiry: "what in the world might 
'break' my proposed action?" 
166. This lesson was made especially clear after the famous Ford Pinto case, in which 
Ford was held liable for its decision to release a car that assessment had revealed would 
explode upon low impact to the rear bumper. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. 
Rptr. 348, 358-61 (Ct. App. 1981). Ford had based its decision on a cost-benefit analysis 
that the number of expected deaths did not warrant the expense of the redesign. See id. at 
384. 
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A particularly powerful example of this is found in the "quality 
assurance" practices of the software industry. The quality assur-
ance ("the QA") stage of software development is the stage at 
which engineers attempt to rid a new computer program of errors 
(of the sort we commonly refer to as "bugs") that may arise when 
demands are made on the program that may not have been fore-
seen by its original designers. 167 During the QA stage, a series of 
engineers attempt to "break" the program by proactively seeking 
out the circumstances in which the carefully crafted sequences of 
code stop working as intended. 
QA usually proceeds at two levels: (1) "black-box" (or user) test-
ing, and (2) "white-box" (or programmer) testing. 168 In black-box 
testing, an analyst follows the directions in a carefully prepared 
use case, which instructs the analyst to test the program as 
though she is an anticipated user. 169 For example, an analyst test-
ing recruiting software might follow the prompts of a use case 
that tells her she is a job applicant trying to upload her resume, 
and asks her to find out what would happen if the resume she up-
loads is blank, is 100 pages long, is in a foreign language, or has 
command characters embedded in the text, etc. When the black-
box tester performs an action that causes the program to seize or 
otherwise misperform, she then sends the problem to the white-
box analyst who examines the actual code for errors that might be 
responsible. Together, QA analysts try to "break" the program, in 
order to anticipate and resolve any programming errors or over-
sights that might compromise the performance of the software in 
the real world. 170 
The Chesapeake story demonstrates how natural resource 
managers might learn from software programmers, by including 
an additional step in environmental review by which they run the 
linear causal assessment backward as well as forward, asking not 
only what external factors might be upset by a proposed resource 
management strategy, but also what external factors might upset 
the strategy itself. In natural resource management "quality as-
surance," the planners would consider a proposed strategy from 
167. See generally GLENFORD J. MEYERS, THE ART OF SOFTWARE TESTING (1979); G. 
GoRDON SCHULMEYER & JAMES I. MCMANUS, THE HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE QUALITY 
AsSURANCE (3d ed. 1999). 
168. See, e.g., MEYERS, supra note 167, at 8-11. 
169. See generally WRITING EFFECTIVE USE CASES (Alistair Cockburn ed., 2001). 
170. See MEYERS, supra 167, at 18-20. 
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multiple vantage points in the network, asking "what factors or 
events could cause our plan to fail?" Tempered by a risk analysis 
(allocating attention to such factors according to their likelihood 
and potential magnitude)171 and an outer boundary of proximate 
causation, 172 resource managers would brainstorm causal connec-
tions back and forth across the proposed plan, seeking any points 
of friction that deserve further inquiry. 
According to this technique, a natural resource planner con-
fronting the Chesapeake wetlands policy would proceed as fol-
lows. As in traditional review, the first step would be to isolate 
the goal and purposes intended by the management strategy: 
Our goal is to protect wetland services provided by the tidal wetlands 
that ring the Chesapeake. Our plan is to accomplish this by protect-
ing wetlands at an elevation of one and one-halftimes the mean high 
tide from structural development that might compromise service 
provision. This should ensure a stable margin of wetlands sufficient 
to provide habitat, water purification, and flood control. Hardening 
the barrier beyond this protected margin should be acceptable, be-
cause the amount of wetland protected is sufficient to provide the 
needed services. 
Mter making the important inquiries of traditional linear review, 
the planner's next step is to consider external factors that might 
cause the plan itself to backfire. The planner might ask whether 
anticipated hardening landward of the jurisdictional line might 
somehow compromise the health of the protected wetlands sea-
ward of the line, and determine whether this inquiry deserves 
further consideration. Similarly, the planner might consider 
whether enforcement issues are likely to complicate success of the 
plan, or whether the likelihood of increased agricultural run-off 
might warrant adjustment of the jurisdictional line. And, at some 
point in the process of considering what might sideline the goals 
of the strategy, we might imagine our planner's thought process 
to run as follows: 
171. This is risk analysis of the traditional Learned Hand formula variety, where the 
burden of preventing a harm is the product of the probability of its occurrence and the 
magnitude of its potential harm. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 
(2d Cir. 194 7). By this technique, the impact of extraterrestrial invasion on wetlands pro-
tection, coupled with a fast risk analysis, might prove unworthy of further consideration-
but the impact of possible sea level rise, given the data available in the 1970s, would still 
warrant attention. 
172. See, e.g., Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
709 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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Come to think of it, everything in this strategy is tied to the eleva-
tion of the protected wetlands above sea level. If sea level were to 
change, this would change the amount of wetlands protected. If sea 
level were to lower, then more wetlands would be protected. For ex-
ample, if we enter another ice age, sea level will fall as water is 
locked into expanding polar glaciers, and we might have more wet-
lands (if they are not covered by continental ice). But if sea level 
rises, fewer wetlands will be protected, and the barrier will act as an 
impermeable boundary above which wetlands cannot move over time 
as they naturally do. If sea level rises, then, the plan is likely to fail. 
So what is the chance of that happening? Many features in the geo-
logic record tell us that sea level is not static over time, but which 
way is it likely to go, and over what kind of time horizon are changes 
likely to happen? This is something we should probably look into a 
bit further. 
1019 
Having isolated the potential problem, the planner then en-
gages in the risk analysis. She will ask how likely is it that sea 
level will rise or fall. If she does not know, she will seek more in-
formation: "How much data do we have about sea level rise?"; 
"What do we know about the likelihood of sea level rise over our 
time horizon?"; then, if not already established, "What is a rea-
sonable time horizon for this strategy?"; and "Are there any fore-
seeable factors that might cause additional sea level rise in this 
time horizon?" 
Even in the 1970s, before climate change became an issue, sci-
entists had charted a background rate of sea level rise over the 
past century. 173 In other words, data about sea level rise were 
there all along, but nobody had thought to ask about the data. 
Linear environmental assessment alone would not have uncov-
ered the significance of this looming threat to the management 
strategy. Even the "worst case scenario" inquiry at the limit of 
NEPA assessment is essentially a linear inquiry, asking only 
about the worst possible impacts arising from the proposed gov-
ernment action, and not about the worst case scenario in which 
the proposed action might play a supporting role. Only a more 
flexible inquiry that reversed the forward causal path could have 
directed the natural resource managers' attention to this latent 
flaw in the plan-and might have made the difference between 
the Bay's recovery from the dead zone, and its condemnation to 
expanded anoxia. 
173. See Titus, supra note 125, at 1297-1300, fig.4. 
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It is important to note that there is nothing especially ground-
breaking about this kind of causally expanded analysis; it is not 
only commonplace in the consumer goods quality assurance proc-
ess, but it is also the strategy of weighing possibilities that most 
of us reflexively use whenever we make important decisions 
about choices between alternatives. When we consider which job 
to take, which place to live, whether or not to commit, or how best 
to accomplish a goal, we hardly start from the proposed action 
and trace consequences blindly forward in time! Rather, we pon-
der the various factors within the relevant network that bear on 
the decision, the various "what ifs" that ultimately help us evalu-
ate the choice: ''What if I receive the other job offer next week?", 
or "How would this basement fare in a flood?" 
Causally expanded, network-based assessment is thus the 
bread and butter of ordinary good decision making-and yet it is 
not among the obligations of traditional environmental review. 
Perhaps the time has come that it should be. To the extent that 
multidirectional causal analysis duplicates existing patterns of 
assessment, it puts no additional burden on natural resource 
planning. But to the extent it compels a critical chain of inquiry 
that might otherwise be missed, it might prove the difference be-
tween a successful natural resource management strategy and a 
catastrophic collision with the law of unintended consequences-
for example, the accidental loss of the very Chesapeake wetlands 
designated for protection. 
The Chesapeake story is a powerful cautionary tale, highlight-
ing the problem of the limits of conventional environment as-
sessment. How much protection does linear environmental as-
sessment really afford? On the other hand, causally expanded 
network assessment poses new problems. How far down the line 
of causation must we look, and how many lines should we follow? 
Demonstrating that we should ask more assessment questions 
than we currently do is one thing, but under the network model, 
how will we know when we have asked enough questions? Net-
work assessment threatens to overwhelm natural resource man-
agement decision making without a decision rule for knowing 
when you have reached the end of the assessment. 
This is a formidable problem, and yet one that is familiar 
within the architecture of the common law. In particular, the doc-
trine of proximate causation has evolved as a means of constrain-
ing the potentially limitless duty of care that we owe to prevent 
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foreseeable harms under the principles of tort law. 174 If a harm is 
not reasonably foreseeable, no one can be held responsible for fail-
ing to avoid it. At a certain point of attenuation into the future, 
even the most knowledgeable earth scientist cannot forecast how 
events will unfold, especially within the complex adaptive net-
works of regional ecosystems. 175 Putting the model into practice 
will enable the articulation of a more refined decision rule for 
completion; in the meanwhile, we can rely on the familiar vocabu-
lary of proximate causation as a means of establishing the 
boundaries of causally expanded assessment. 
However, a primary objection to the suggestion that we ex-
periment with additional assessment obligations is that environ-
mental assessment already consumes scarce time and financial 
resources at a sobering rate. Indeed, we should not be quick to 
add to the imposition that has already led to the backlash against 
NEPA in the House of Representatives. This is a serious concern 
that deserves careful scrutiny before any model of network as-
sessment-here only thinly sketched out-becomes formal policy. 
Nevertheless, Virginia's natural resource law provides a solid 
example of how to impose additional review requirements in the 
least onerous way via the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, 176 
which successfully imposed new obligations to minimize phospho-
rous load increases associated with coastal development on top of 
an already onerous array of assessment requirements. The new 
regulations require that all development in the resource protec-
tion area be assessed for any changes in phosphorous loading, 
and that best management practices be adopted as necessary to 
bring the phosphorous load back to the pre-project baseline.177 
The regulations are onerous as a facial matter, but they are ac-
companied by exhaustive guidance for performing the required 
tasks at every step, making the process much more straightfor-
ward (and thus palatable) to regulated parties. 178 
174. See, e.g., Babbit, 515 U.S. at 687,709-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
175. Still, the baseline for causation in natural resource planning should be defined not 
according to the generic "reasonable person standard" but the "reasonable earth-scientist 
standard" of foreseeability. Earth science teaches us, and Katrina reminded us, of the im-
portance of heeding even attenuated causality across ecosystem function. 
176. VA. CODE ANN.§ 10.1-2100 to -2116 (2005). 
177. See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE§ 10-20-120(9) (2004). 
178. Interview with Carl Hershner, Dir., Ctr. for Coastal Res. Mgmt., Va. Inst. of Ma-
rine Sci., in Gloucester, Va. (Jan. 23, 2006). 
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Natural resource managers' experience with the Chesapeake 
Bay Preservation Act indicates that the best way to impose addi-
tional assessment requirements on natural resource planning is 
to make them as easy as possible to follow, by accompanying such 
requirements or suggested best practices with technical guidance 
that leads the planner from one step of the process to the next. 
Were planners asked or encouraged to cap traditional assessment 
with a causally expanded network-based inquiry, it might be wise 
to make available a list of questions that planners should con-
sider in each realm of resource management-a stylized decision-
tree of inquiry for proposed actions relating to water, air, land, or 
biodiversity resources, coupled with more specific decision-trees 
within such categories-a veritable "use case" for natural re-
source planning. 
In this respect, asking natural resource planning to depart 
from the linear model of review further tracks the development of 
computer science, which has progressed from the linear to the 
"object-oriented" programming model. Linear programs can pro-
ceed in only one direction, while object-oriented programs are 
structured to enable freer and more efficient movement between 
networked categories of operations, connected in "parallel" rather 
than "series" formation. In contrast to the linear model of envi-
ronmental review, a more "object-oriented" environmental review 
might be conceptualized as a network model of review. Like a 
network of communication lines, roads, or neurons, the network 
approach to assessment encourages the planner to trace potential 
causal connections along the circuitous routes that bridge the 
proposed management strategy to the external environment in 
which it would play a role. Network assessment would encourage 
more facile consideration of impacts that arise over attenuated 
branches of a complex ecosystem (as between the Mississippi 
River and coastal land loss in Louisiana), and a more ambidex-
trously causal analysis of the relationship between the strategy, 
the environmental factors it might "break," and the environ-
mental factors that might "break" it-leading to unintended con-
sequences. 
Of course, expanded assessment responsibilities will consume 
additional resources, no matter how well-accompanied by techni-
cal guidance (although this should rightly be viewed as an in-
vestment in preventing more costly unintended consequences). 
Moreover, we will need to better define the end-point of causally 
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expanded assessment, to ensure the benefits of more sophisti-
cated review are not outweighed by the needless costs of overly 
speculative review. Finally, even a sophisticated policy of natural 
resource management QA cannot foresee every potential conse-
quence, nor is risk analysis a guarantee that tiny risks will not 
materialize into catastrophes. 179 As a certain matter of probabil-
ity, they occasionally will. But perfection should not be the enemy 
of the good. A category five storm on the Gulf Coast was not an 
unforeseeable or even an unlikely risk, as recognized by increas-
ingly alarmed Louisiana leaders in recent discussions about re-
structuring management of the Mississippi.180 Nor was sea-level 
rise wholly unforeseeable in Virginia in the 1970s, based on his-
toric incremental measurements along the Chesapeake coastline 
(if not on global warming concerns). If we cannot engage in per-
fect natural resource management, we can at least do better. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As our ability to manipulate the environment outpaces our 
ability to understand it, the need to move toward more sophisti-
cated models of natural resource planning and environmental as-
sessment becomes pronounced. The devastating tales of the post-
Katrina flooding of New Orleans and the loss of protected Chesa-
peake wetlands demonstrate the dilemma of unintended conse-
quences of natural resource management-but they also offer 
counsel on how to avoid them in the future. 
Taken together, the Louisiana and Chesapeake stories suggest 
three lessons for natural resource management. First, policy 
makers must consider the full extent of lateral ecosystem inter-
connectedness when intervening in such complex natural systems 
as alluvial rivers or shorelines. Second, they must give special 
consideration to the ways that regional ecosystems change over 
time-both over geologic time, and in light of the more acceler-
ated changes that accompany foreseeably abrupt natural or an-
thropogenic transitions, such as climate change. 
179. For example, the threat of a planetary asteroid collision that was temporarily pro-
jected for 2029 has receded into the realm of the improbable, but not the impossible. See 
Guy Gugliotta, A New Path for Asteroids: A Craft's Gravity Could Protect Earth, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 10, 2005, at A3; see also Alan Boyle, Astronomers Rule Out Asteroid Risk in 
2029: Further Observations Show Space Rock Won't Hit Earth, http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/6751433/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
180. E.g., Brancaccio, supra note 35 (noting comments by Daniel Zwerdling). 
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Finally, natural resource planners must expand assessment 
practices from the traditional linear model, which considers only 
the significance of impacts that flow forward from the proposed 
project, toward a causally expanded model that also considers 
how network components might intervene to impact the proposed 
strategy. Such a network-based model would not only facilitate 
laterally and temporally expansive ecosystemic assessment, but 
also the consideration of causal interplay between the proposal 
and network factors that might ultimately undermine its ulti-
mate goals. That we could not possibly have foreseen unintended 
consequence using linear assessment is a passable excuse only 
once. 
It is ironic-and disquieting-that our two cautionary tales 
herald the importance of better natural resource planning at the 
very time that Congress is considering recommendations to relax 
existing requirements for environmental review under NEP A. 181 
There may well be ways to improve upon the administrative base-
line set by NEPA, but changes that would weaken the quality of 
long-range environmental assessment threaten our ability to 
forestall potential devastation of the sort experienced in New Or-
leans and feared in Virginia. Now more than ever, natural re-
source planning must become more, not less, ambitious. 
Nevertheless, NEPA, critical though it is, defines the floor, not 
the ceiling of natural resource planning. Policy makers and re-
source managers should respect the assessment floor mandated 
by state and federal natural resources law, and aspire to a more 
powerful model of network-based assessment that will foster 
more robust environmental policies that better anticipate the 
causal interplay within complex regional ecosystems. 
Future advocacy for expanded assessment must contend with 
the serious issues of increased costs and uncertain limits associ-
ated with expanded obligations at a time when existing assess-
ment requirements are burdensome to smaller planning agencies. 
181. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). The United States House of Representatives Committee 
on Resources is considering recommendations by its NEPA Task Forces to amend NEPA 
in ways that might strengthen mitigation requirements but would expand exemptions and 
weaken the requirements for environmental assessment. See H.R. COMM. ON RES., 109TH 
CONG., TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND TASK 
FORCE ON UPDATING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, lN!TlAL FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, 25-29 (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://resourcescommittee.house. 
gov/nepataskforce/report/nepareport_finaldraft.pdf. 
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However, the transition to network-assessment best practices 
could be aided by the development of detailed technical guidance 
to lead planners from one step of the process to the next, a realm 
in which future work is sorely needed. In addition, planners could 
gradually adapt the expanded network model into existing as-
sessment practices by limiting the scale of proposal for which 
network assessment is appropriate, beginning with only the larg-
est or programmatic assessment endeavors and gradually intro-
ducing the techniques for smaller projects as the process becomes 
more streamlined. In the end, a move toward network assess-
ment will prove an investment well worth the initial costs when it 
helps us avoid the more costly wrath of the Law of Unintended 
Consequences. 
Assessment of this kind is hardly without precedent. Not only 
does it represent the sort of careful evaluation that individuals 
routinely apply in the sphere of private decision-making, but net-
work-oriented models are also available among the assessment 
practices of consumer products manufacturers, such as automo-
bile and software testing. It may be that the more careful as-
sessment associated with consumer products is the result of the 
strict liability regime in which this market is situated-but this is 
all the more reason for natural resource managers to take heed of 
their methods. Mter all, natural resource management is ulti-
mately a strict liability affair as well. The Natural Resources 
Law of Unintended Consequences mitigates damages neither for 
good faith nor complex causation. And unfortunately, when our 
natural resources and the services they provide are damaged, we 
all bear the loss. 
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